Naturalismo, evoluzione e progresso morale

Some naturalists reject the possibility of inclusivist progress as an expansion of the “circle of moral concern” on the basis that human psychology has not substantially changed since the Pleistocene, thus remaining bound to tribalistic, exclusivist, and shortsighted perspectives because of the socio-environmental conditions in which its essential elements have been se- lected throughout the evolution of our species. This paper aims to show that the main objec- tions against inclusivist views of moral progress are unconvincing, because such inference – found at the heart of both progressive alternatives and conservative positions – is not justified, and unsupported by evidence. Moreover, alternative progressive strategies seem to require inclusivist dynamics rather than to replace them, and/or they assume objectionable normative views, resulting in plausible ideas of social progress, but not of moral progress stricto sensu. I will eventually conclude that inclusivist views of moral progress might be consistent with a liberal naturalistic approach.