Atienza sobre la dogmática jurídica: cinco tesis para discutir

This paper analyzes and critiques several theses by Manuel Atienza concerning legal dogmatics. The central argument is that, although Atienza’s views contain some partial truths, they suffer from two major shortcomings. First, he treats legal dogmatics as a homogenous whole, failing to account for the variety of operations and styles of doctrinal work. Recognizing this diversity allows for distinctions between scientific, technical-scientific, and purely technical activities. Second, Atienza assumes—without sufficient justification—that some form of moral objectivism is essential to legal dogmatics. The paper argues that evaluative terms in law can be explained without such ontological commitments. This alternative approach is more consistent with scientific standards of ontological parsimony. Since simpler explanations with equal explanatory power are preferable, Atienza’s framework proves unnecessarily burdensome. His account repeatedly overlooks this important methodological requirement.