Empowering or Controlling Intermediaries? The Strategic Dilemma of Indirect Governance in International Security

This research examines the conditions under which Security Assistance can generate meaningful effects in contemporary indirect intervention. It argues that assistance outcomes depend less on the volume of support provided than on the fit between providers’ preferences and the strategic environment in which assistance unfolds. Drawing on the Competence–Control framework, the study shows that providers face a recurring trade-off between empowering competent recipients and retaining control over their behavior. This trade-off structures providers’ choices in Security Assistance, as efforts to increase recipient competence often reduce external control, while measures designed to maximize control can undermine recipient effectiveness. Providers’ preferences determine whether they prioritize competence or control, but several features of the strategic environment, notably recipients’ competence and the size of both the demand and supply sides of assistance, shape whether these preferences can be translated into effective policy instruments. Empirically, the research combines plausibility probes with process-tracing analyses of French assistance in Chad and Italian assistance in Libya, showing that Security Assistance is effective only when strategic aims, available instruments, and local conditions are mutually aligned.