Moral Conflict Resolution and Normative Adjustment

In this paper, I show how a pragmatist stance may address the problem of the resolvability of moral conflicts. Pragmatism challenges skeptical and relativist views by arguing that moral conflict resolution is possible via inquiry and ex-change of reasons. From a normative standpoint, pragmatism also differs from utilitarian and deontological views, according to which a specific moral theory is correct in every context. From a pragmatist point of view, both utilitarian and deontological responses can be justified, depending on contextual conditions and reasons, on the people to whom reasons are offered, and on constraints of inclusivity, publicity, empirical accuracy, and coherence. Pragmatism’s empiricist method for solving conflicts and making normative adjustments can be seen as a form of reflective equilibrium, where moral beliefs and commitments are ad-justed in light of new non-moral knowledge, such as evidence about the reliabil-ity of decision processes. Recent empirical research also supports pragmatism’s pluralist and flexible approach more than monistic and generalist normative views like deontology and utilitarianism.