La mente vulnerabile: la “gettatezza” dei viventi

Contemporary panpsychism has revitalized the ancient idea that it is possible to identify a basic principle capable of explaining the entire reality. If we consider that portion of reality formed by living beings, the panpsychist thesis seems to be confirmed by increasing scientific evidence that animals and plants, and not only humans, have a “mind”, and therefore, intelligence and rationality (logos) are widespread in all living reality. However, the general tendency to explain living beings primarily in mentalistic terms is proof of the persistence of rationalism in Western culture and the supremacy of logical thinking. This affects also ethical reasoning when it is argued that non-human living beings deserve moral consideration due to the fact that they are cognitive subjects. Is the dignity of living beings ultimately grounded in their logical dimension and cognitive powers? The present paper intends to question this way of reasoning. By reinterpreting Heidegger’s notion of “thrownness” (Geworfenheit), we will argue that living beings are not primarily cognitive but vulnerable subjects. In contrast to the common interpretation of vulnerability in terms of weakness and deficiency, the idea is put forward that only vulnerable beings can be powerful subjects and that their always “thrown” character is what primarily deserves our moral consideration.