This essay examines Silvana Castignone’s reconstruction of legal obligation, focusing on her analysis of Hart’s position (and Bobbio’s critique presented at the 1965 Bellagio Conference on legal obligation). Her reconstruction highlights Hart’s distinction between internal and external points of view and accepts Hart’s critiques to Bentham’s predictive theory of obligation. Castignone deepens the discussion by linking acceptance to efficacy, arguing that legal norms require both normative endorsement and practical enforceability. She clarifies that mere acceptance is insufficient without institutional power. Her account bridges the normative and empirical dimensions of law. Ultimately, she offers a convincing answer to Bobbio’s question of whose acceptance underlies legal systems.
CASTIGNONE ON LEGAL OBLIGATION
Ratti Giovanni Battista
2025-01-01
Abstract
This essay examines Silvana Castignone’s reconstruction of legal obligation, focusing on her analysis of Hart’s position (and Bobbio’s critique presented at the 1965 Bellagio Conference on legal obligation). Her reconstruction highlights Hart’s distinction between internal and external points of view and accepts Hart’s critiques to Bentham’s predictive theory of obligation. Castignone deepens the discussion by linking acceptance to efficacy, arguing that legal norms require both normative endorsement and practical enforceability. She clarifies that mere acceptance is insufficient without institutional power. Her account bridges the normative and empirical dimensions of law. Ultimately, she offers a convincing answer to Bobbio’s question of whose acceptance underlies legal systems.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
