On primary and secondary rules (1968)

This paper examines the widespread yet unstable use of the distinction between primary and secondary rules in both general legal theory and specialized legal disciplines. It argues that the variability in interpretation arises from the dual nature of the term secondary, which may carry either a neutral or an evaluative meaning—not only in ordinary language but also in various technical contexts. The analysis identifies two principal ways in which this distinction operates: first, as a temporal relation, where secondary simply denotes what follows; and second, as an axiological relation, which itself takes two forms. In one, secondary refers to what is less important, auxiliary, or marginal in relation to what is principal; in the other, it signifies a hierarchical subordination, corresponding to the relation superior–subordinate. Drawing on both linguistic and conceptual parallels, the paper elucidates how these differing senses of secondary shape the understanding and application of the primary–secondary distinction within legal theory.