This work is part of a line of research on reflections on “the concept of law” developed within American legal realism. Specifically, it analyzes the positions on this topic of two prominent American realists: Max Radin and Thurman W. Arnold. Radin reviews the theses on the “definition of law” developed by founding fathers of the realist school, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and John Chipman Gray, placing particular emphasis on the justification of judicial decisions as a central element of “what the courts actually do”. For his part, Arnold focuses his analysis, rather than on “predicting what the courts will actually do,” on an aspect of the “Law” that other authors of the realist school had demystified rather than investigated. This is, in Arnold’s own words, its (important) facet as a “great repository of emotionally relevant social symbols.”
Dos variaciones sobre un tema holmesiano: el concepto de derecho según Max Radin y Thurman W. Arnold
Luca Malagoli
2025-01-01
Abstract
This work is part of a line of research on reflections on “the concept of law” developed within American legal realism. Specifically, it analyzes the positions on this topic of two prominent American realists: Max Radin and Thurman W. Arnold. Radin reviews the theses on the “definition of law” developed by founding fathers of the realist school, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and John Chipman Gray, placing particular emphasis on the justification of judicial decisions as a central element of “what the courts actually do”. For his part, Arnold focuses his analysis, rather than on “predicting what the courts will actually do,” on an aspect of the “Law” that other authors of the realist school had demystified rather than investigated. This is, in Arnold’s own words, its (important) facet as a “great repository of emotionally relevant social symbols.”I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.



