Smart grids increasingly rely on digital communication, expanding the attack surface beyond the reach of conventional network intrusion-detection systems. Physics-based monitoring can detect anomalies that bypass traffic inspection, but most prior methods only provide binary detection and do not identify attackers or describe associated network behaviour. This paper presents a two-stage cyber–physical detection and attribution pipeline for the IEEE 14-bus smart grid. In Stage 1, a four-layer GATv2 model analyses sliding windows of PLC sensor data and operates as a binary anomaly detector (Benign vs. Attack), achieving  (Formula presented.)  accuracy, macro-F1  (Formula presented.), recall  (Formula presented.), and ROC-AUC  (Formula presented.)  (mean ± std, 5 seeds, tuned configuration). GATv2 achieves the highest recall among all tested binary classifiers (Random Forest:  (Formula presented.) ; SVM:  (Formula presented.) ; KNN:  (Formula presented.)  at low AUC  (Formula presented.) ), the primary metric in safety-critical intrusion detection where a missed attack is more dangerous than a false alarm. A Welch t-test across five independent seeds confirms that GATv2 and RF are statistically equivalent in accuracy ( (Formula presented.),  (Formula presented.) ). A six-class ablation study reveals that Backdoor is physically near-invisible (F1  (Formula presented.), lowest among all classes), motivating the network attribution stage. In Stage 2, triggered only after anomaly detection, a LightGBM model trained on 27 network-traffic features attributes the attack campaign, reaching  (Formula presented.)  accuracy and macro-F1  (Formula presented.)  across all six cyber classes. A final enrichment stage correlates anomaly windows with network events to extract attacker IP and MAC information, suspicious ports, Modbus manipulation signals, and connection-rate anomalies, producing a structured forensic report. Ablations and visual analyses show that graph-based physical sensing and statistical network attribution are complementary. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to combine topology-aware GNN physical detection, multi-class cyber attribution, and automated forensic enrichment in a single pipeline evaluated on this dataset.

Graph-Attentive Cyber–Physical Attack Detection and Forensic Attribution in Smart Grids: A Two-Stage Pipeline Combining Physical Anomaly Detection with Network Traffic Analysis

Danilo Greco;Giovanni Battista Gaggero
2026-01-01

Abstract

Smart grids increasingly rely on digital communication, expanding the attack surface beyond the reach of conventional network intrusion-detection systems. Physics-based monitoring can detect anomalies that bypass traffic inspection, but most prior methods only provide binary detection and do not identify attackers or describe associated network behaviour. This paper presents a two-stage cyber–physical detection and attribution pipeline for the IEEE 14-bus smart grid. In Stage 1, a four-layer GATv2 model analyses sliding windows of PLC sensor data and operates as a binary anomaly detector (Benign vs. Attack), achieving  (Formula presented.)  accuracy, macro-F1  (Formula presented.), recall  (Formula presented.), and ROC-AUC  (Formula presented.)  (mean ± std, 5 seeds, tuned configuration). GATv2 achieves the highest recall among all tested binary classifiers (Random Forest:  (Formula presented.) ; SVM:  (Formula presented.) ; KNN:  (Formula presented.)  at low AUC  (Formula presented.) ), the primary metric in safety-critical intrusion detection where a missed attack is more dangerous than a false alarm. A Welch t-test across five independent seeds confirms that GATv2 and RF are statistically equivalent in accuracy ( (Formula presented.),  (Formula presented.) ). A six-class ablation study reveals that Backdoor is physically near-invisible (F1  (Formula presented.), lowest among all classes), motivating the network attribution stage. In Stage 2, triggered only after anomaly detection, a LightGBM model trained on 27 network-traffic features attributes the attack campaign, reaching  (Formula presented.)  accuracy and macro-F1  (Formula presented.)  across all six cyber classes. A final enrichment stage correlates anomaly windows with network events to extract attacker IP and MAC information, suspicious ports, Modbus manipulation signals, and connection-rate anomalies, producing a structured forensic report. Ablations and visual analyses show that graph-based physical sensing and statistical network attribution are complementary. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to combine topology-aware GNN physical detection, multi-class cyber attribution, and automated forensic enrichment in a single pipeline evaluated on this dataset.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11567/1311796
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